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Among the major IT security challenges facing 
organizations is non-malicious employee behavior 
that nevertheless poses significant threats to an 
organization’s IT security. Using a grounded theory 
methodology, this paper finds that organizational 
security behaviors are inherently related to employee 
assumptions regarding the importance of IT security 
policy compliance and regarding the reason why IT 
security measures are implemented. Analyzing these 
assumptions uncovers four profiles of perspectives 
concerning IT security: the IT Security Indulgence, 
the IT Security Overindulgence, the IT Knows Best 
and the IT Security Disconnect profiles. These 
profiles are useful in understanding employee IT 
security behaviors and may help IT departments in 
developing more effective strategies designed to 
ensure policy compliance. 
 
 
1. Introduction and Literature 
Background  
 
Employees pose a significant threat to 
information technology security (ITsec) in 
organizations [4, 28]. Studies indicate that employees 
are responsible for over 50% of reported security 
breaches [21] and that carelessness or lack of 
awareness accounts for nearly 40% of insider security 
incidents [29]. To mitigate insider threats, 
organizations have invested significant resources in 
developing behavioral as well as technical 
countermeasures, including policy development, 
training programs, and technological security updates 
[20] and various industries have advanced standards 
regulating organizational IT security measures [4]. 
Nevertheless, some employees continue to show non-
malicious opportunistic behaviors, circumventing IT 
security policies and thereby decreasing IT security 
effectiveness. Not all insiders are non-compliant, and 
not all non-compliant insiders have the same profiles. 
 In this paper, we investigate the working 
assumptions and the backgrounds of compliant and 
non-compliant employees, making this study one of 
the few that touches on the subject of profiling 
internal non-malicious volitional security violators. 
We uncover four profiles of IT security, each with 
different assumptions about ITsec measures. In the 
following paragraphs, we give a brief overview of the 
literature on IT security before describing the 
methodology and the analysis sections. The IT 
security literature is extensive, covering such 
manifold topics as information sharing among peers 
[11], disclosure of vulnerabilities in software [16], 
disclosure of security breaches [23], technical 
capabilities against outside attacks [2] and technical 
capabilities against opportunistic employees [12]. 
Several published reviews of the ITsec literature 
provide comprehensive meta-analyses of technical 
and behavioral ITsec research [25], of the deterrence 
approach in compliance [8], and of the different 
approaches to increase employee compliance to ITsec 
policies [1]. Evident in these reviews of the literature 
is the assumption implicit in most empirical IT 
security research that IT security is de facto “good”, 
that the more IT security, the better, and that 
motivating employees to comply with IT security is a 
highly desirable objective for IT departments. Users 
face a plethora of ever-increasing security 
requirements that are sometimes viewed as 
constraining, demanding, and challenging to 
understand or follow [18, 19, 28]. The burden of 
security compliance may induce some employees to 
circumvent the policies with negative consequences 
for organizations [18, 24]. In a survey of thousands of 
employees, such explanations as “not-thinking about 
policies because of work overload” and “the 
inconvenience to follow policies” are reported as the 
main reasons for ISP violations [5]. 
 This study seeks to advance our understanding of 
the assumptions behind compliant and non-malicious 
non-compliant users and the implications of these 
assumptions for IT security. In particular, the study 
employs a case study to uncover assumptions of 
compliant and non-compliant users to ITsec measures 
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and, in so doing, create profiles of internal 
employees’ perspectives of IT security. Using a 
grounded theory methodology, we analyzed data 
obtained via interviews of faculty, staff, and 
administrators at a large private university in the 
southwest United States. Our analysis uncovers two 
basic assumptions underlying varying perspectives of 
IT security in organizations. Using these two 
assumptions, we develop a matrix of IT security 
policy perspectives (MSPP).  The matrix depicts four 
perspectives of IT security policies.  These 
perspectives are helpful in understanding internal 
employee reactions to increased security as well as 
their potential to circumvent IT security policies. 
Consistent with grounded theory methodology, 
we did not enter the field with specific theories in 
mind. However, we did undertake a thorough review 
of the IT security literature to apprise ourselves of the 
theories and constructs widely used in studies of IT 
security and policy compliance. It was through our 
reading of the IT security literature that we noticed 
the dearth of research and theory into understanding 
the mindset of compliant vs. non-compliant 
professionals in organizations. In the interest of 
space, we refer the readers to several review papers 
for in-depth coverage of the IT security literature [1, 
8, 25]. The remainder of our paper will present our 
method, data analysis, and emergent matrix of the 
profiles of compliant and non-compliant insiders as 
well as the implications of these profiles. 
 
2. Methodology  
 
Grounded theory is a methodology that does not 
force-fit data to a priori theory; rather, its aim is to 
derive theory from data [6]. The building blocks of 
the theoretical framework (the matrix) to be 
developed in this approach are intimately tied to the 
data [9]. Grounded theory has three basic 
components: 1) theoretical sampling and site 
selection, 2) data collection, and 3) data analysis and 
validation [6, 10]. 
 
2.1 The Site and Data Collection 
 
The data collection site is a southwestern private 
higher education institution (PHEI) in the United 
States comprising ten colleges and employing 
approximately 1,000 staff and faculty. As of the date 
of this research, the university had roughly $300 
million in operating cash, with total assets around $3 
billion. Information security is highly valued by the 
university. The position of chief information security 
officer (CISO) was created in 2008. 
To date, PHEI has never been hacked and, 
according to the CISO, is at the forefront of security 
implementations. In 2014, double authentication 
VPN was implemented so that those users who were 
off-campus but who wanted to access specific 
systems would not be able to access the network 
without a second authentication level (a code sent to 
an app on their smartphones). The trend for the 
coming years is that PHEI is moving toward making 
the majority of the systems inaccessible without a 
double-authentication method. Furthermore, PHEI 
has begun a project to encrypt voice mails and web 
and videoconferences. In recent years, PHEI has also 
added additional security including encryption to all 
institutionally provided computer devices. Although 
private devices are permitted on the premises, the 
devices can only access the Internet and no device 
can connect to the networks and printers. All 
institutionally owned mobile devices are tracked and 
remotely accessible by PHEI’s IT department so that 
PHEI can wipe any device if stolen or lost. PHEI’s 
website contains 43 pages of ITsec policies and 
guidelines. This strong emphasis on security policies 
makes PHEI a good site to analyze the plethora of 
users’ responses to increased IT security. 
Data collection consisted of conducting 32 semi-
structured interviews (30 respondents) across the 
research setting.  Sixteen IT related staff (4 females 
and 12 males) and 14 users (8 females and 6 males) 
were interviewed. Sample questions included “How 
do security policies enable and constrain your work 
practice?”, “In what ways do IT security policies 
make you more effective in your role?” and “Are 
there ways that you feel the security policies 
constrain your work? If so, can you give me an 
example?”. Four types of data were collected: 1) the 
interview data 2) internal documents on ITsec 
policies, 3) Q&A emails exchanged with IT security 
specialists, and 4) notes taken during attendance at a 
security awareness meeting designed for end users.  
We conducted the interviews over a 4-month period 
in 2015 and ranged from 17 to 48 minutes with an 
average of around 30.  
 
2.2 Validation  
 
Data validation occurred in two phases. First, we 
engaged in source triangulation. We sought input 
from directors who are faculty members, directors 
who are staff, faculty who are also administrators 
(e.g., department heads) and faculty not holding any 
administrative role. Some staff members interviewed 
were administrators, others were not, some staff in 
the Information Technology Services (ITS) were 
senior staff members, others were junior in their 
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position. Some ITS staff worked as a bridge between 
the IT department and faculty/staff/admins, other ITS 
staff worked purely for the IT department. We 
triangulated at the strategic, managerial and 
operational levels in the organization in order to 
establish credibility, enhance the validity of the 
results, and avoid skewing the results [7]. 
In the second phase of the validation, six of the 
study’s participants (almost 20% of the total 
interviewed) reviewed the findings. It is important to 
note that this technique, called member checking, is 
the “most critical technique for establishing 
credibility” in a grounded theory approach [14, 7]. 
 
2.3 Data Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis is the individual, with a 
focus on understanding individuals’ perspective of 
ITsec policies their behavioral response to the 
policies. We used Nvivo 10 software to code the data 
in the 3 phases of open, axial, and selective coding 
[17] during which we employed constant 
comparative analysis to guide the effort. This form of 
analysis allows for an evolution of themes, concepts, 
and categories from the data collected [22]. 
Following Charmaz [3], we interacted with the data 
to develop codes. Codes were then compared with 
data and other codes to develop categories. Concepts 
emerged through the process of comparing categories 
with other categories and codes. For example, the 
“user frustration” category described the following 
codes: “painful”, “not fun”, “frustration”, and 
“adversarial dance [with IT]”. The inadequate 
justification” category included codes like “not 
seeing the value yet”, “surprised”, “not 
understanding”, “not knowing why” and “having no 
idea”. The point of saturation for data collection and 
analysis was achieved whenever no new codes 
emerged from the data and when identified categories 
repeated themselves in the data [10]. At this point, we 
grouped the identified categories through axial 
coding. The goal of axial coding is to create themes 
to represent various related concepts identified in the 
transcribed manuscripts. For example, the profile “IT 
Security Overindulgence” emerged by several 
categories related to each other: “loss of productive 
time”, “IT going overboard”, “Not seeing value in 
ITsec measure(s)”, and “lack of justification”. Via 
selective coding, we related the concepts to each 
other to develop the profile matrix. These coding 
techniques ultimately resulted in four profiles (Figure 
1) and 6 action/reaction outcomes toward ITsec 
measures: enforcers, cheerleaders, indifferent, 
circumventors, outspoken frustrated, and cautiously 
frustrated. 
3. Analysis and Discussion  
 
3.1 The Security Assumptions 
 
Via grounded theory, we found two main security 
assumptions: a) Assumptions about the reasons for 
security (the y-axis of Figure 1) and b) assumptions 
about the importance of fully abiding by security 
policies (the x-axis of Figure 1).First, we uncovered a 
continuum of assumptions on security breach effects 
on organizations. Some employees assumed that 
security breaches are regular routine phenomena in 
this day and age and that any security breach is 
unlikely to seriously harm an organization. These 
employees think that the IT department feels so 
strongly about security not necessarily because the 
organization may suffer in the event of a breach, but 
because the IT department would be embarrassed. 
Employees on the other end of this assumption 
spectrum think that security breaches could seriously 
harm PHEI. In the security profiles section, we will 
give examples that describe these assumptions. The 
second assumption, related to the importance of fully 
abiding by security policies, ranges from “always 
important” to “not always important”. Some 
organizational employees perceive that ITsec policies 
are important and therefore try to abide by them even 
if their productivity is hindered. Other employees do 
not perceive the policies as always important and are 
inclined to find a way to circumvent them to reduce 
hindrances to their productivity.   
 
3.2 The Security Profiles 
 
Figure 1 shows four quadrants resulting from the 
two assumptions described above. The IT security 
overindulgence quadrant, comprised of both IT staff 
and professional users, is skeptical about the enforced 
security measures. Individuals in this group assume 
that a security breach is unlikely to seriously harm 
PHEI and that abiding by the security policies is not 
always important. The IT security indulgence 
quadrant is comprised of employees who assume that 
ITsec measures may only embarrass the IT 
department rather than harming the overall 
organization but nevertheless feel that it is best to 
abide by ITsec measures. The “IT Knows Best” 
quadrant assume that the ITsec  policies are always 
important and that a security breach in the 
organization may seriously harm the organization. 
Finally, the IT Security Disconnect quadrant is 
comprised of individuals who assume that a security 
breach could damage the university, but nevertheless 
do not consider it important to abide by ITsec 
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policies. Instead, they believe that a breach of their 
own personal computer or their own ID/password 
would not constitute a security breach for PHEI.    
We categorized each respondent into a quadrant 
based on our analysis of each interview transcript. 
We looked for statements that shed light on their 
assumptions.  We counted ten respondents in the IT 
Security Overindulgence quadrant (6 IT staff and 4 
professional users); 6 respondents in the IT Security 
Indulgence quadrant (all of them users); 10 
respondents in the IT Knows Best quadrant (8 IT and 
2 users) and 4 respondents in the IT Security 
Disconnect quadrant (1 IT and 3 users). These 
profiles are explained next. 
 
 
Figure 1: Matrix of Security Policy Perspectives 
(MSPP) 
 
3.3 IT Security Overindulgence 
 
The IT Security Overindulgence profile is 
comprised of both professional users and IT 
professionals. One might have expected IT 
professionals to all be in the IT Knows Best profile, 
but that was not the case.  The IT professionals fitting 
this profile are the IT client services staff who are 
serving the professional users including faculty, staff 
and administrators in their business and functional 
needs. They find software, solutions or applications 
in the market to serve the functional needs of 
business units. Applications may range from 
proctoring software to online teaching solutions like 
blackboard or Canvas and a plethora of applications 
that enhance teaching, research and administrative 
roles in higher educational institutions. 
These IT professionals who do not think that IT 
knows best and who may feel frustrated with current 
ITsec  measures are the IT staff who are evaluated 
based on their productivity: how many and how fast 
they find solutions and how successfully they meet 
business needs. We notice that the IT staff of this 
group naturally might have a conflict of interest with 
the IT security goals: On the one hand, IT security 
staff want to minimize security vulnerabilities and 
therefore tend to reject the majority of the solutions 
suggested by the IT client services but on the other 
hand, the IT client services takes pride in the number 
of solutions found, suggested and implemented by 
them that solve functional problems and expand 
opportunities in PHEI (Res 5, 8, 10, 11, 13).  
Driving the assumptions of these IT professionals 
is their belief that industry standards in the 
marketplace are enough. They view security breaches 
as routine and mundane (“I use my credit card at 
Home Depot. Home Depot had a breach. Okay. 
That’s no big deal. You get the credit monitoring. 
You go on with life” Res. 8) and feel that the IT 
department need not go beyond industry levels, 
unnecessarily decreasing the productivity levels of 
business units. 
One IT project manager whose role is to find 
software solutions on the market and make 
recommendations for their adoption at PHEI 
experienced frustration at a solution being rejected on 
security grounds in spite of the fact that “it’s a widely 
used system” among universities and “none of them 
(the other universities) have any problems with it.” 
He felt as if the university was trying to impose 
future standards on today’s world: “They’re trying to 
get out ahead of it and require what’s going to be 
standard in a few years, but why we’re requiring it 
now I have no idea…Okay, if it’s (the software) 
standard in the industry and everybody’s okay with 
that, why are we not? I don’t understand it.”  
One IT service staff member expressed some 
doubts about the soundness of some of the decisions 
made by the IT security review team regarding a 
solution he proposed. The following is an excerpt of 
his way of not justifying the IT decision: 
 
Some of the reasons I get. Some of the reasons I 
understand. Some of the reasons are completely, 
totally justified…At the same time, some of the 
reason for questioning it is sometimes a little 
silly. For example, there was a concern over one 
product that we were looking at, a publisher 
material, but it would have the ability to write 
quiz grades back into the learning management 
system. It needed that level of access to write 
grades back. A really obscure, unlikely type 
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scenario. That obscure, unlikely scenario was 
primarily one of the main justifications for saying, 
‘No, you can’t do this integration with this 
publisher because there’s this off chance that 
somebody there might do something unethical 
like that [ability to change a grade].’ That seems a 
little silly and unlikely, because the it’s a well-
known widely trusted publisher, but that was one 
of those scenarios where we didn’t get a chance to 
really do that (Senior Academic Consultant).  
 
High activity organizational users and 
professionals also are part of this group. These 
professionals are evaluated based on productivity, 
specifically based on maintaining a high number of 
program enrollees (Resp. 25, 29 and 30) and/or a 
strong focus on research (Resp. 19 and 28). These are 
fast-paced professionals and they may be less tolerant 
of security constraints or measures that may impede 
or slow their productivity pace than other users who 
do not have a high activity level of work 
environment. 
One administrator who is part of the university’s 
internal marketing department wanted to purchase an 
analytics system to help in the identification and 
analysis of prospective students. Her request was 
denied. She listened to the explanations for why the 
analytics system should not be used, but still does not 
find it justified: 
 
“I took computer science a long time ago. I triple 
majored and one of my majors was computer 
science. And the company that I used to work at 
was a computer company. And so I'm not easily 
intimidated by computer speak. And so it's 
definitely understandable as far as how they [IT 
department] write it [denial of a request] but I'm 
not sure it's defensible… It's understandable, it's 
not justifiable” (Director of a department). 
 
Many others had similar feelings toward ITsec 
measures, aptly summed by one senior faculty 
member: 
 
I think at least in my case that the approach they 
take to this is over control, you tend to develop 
just the impression that they over control because 
of the way they handle their security and other 
things. And so, then they have this reputation for 
over control, and not being there to really serve 
you. You’ve got to release a little bit of control. 
You should be more concerned with focusing on 
the areas that are the biggest threat than focusing 
so much on the devices and securing the devices 
and stuff like that” (Senior professor). 
In summary, the highly active and non-
administrative professionals and users are skeptical 
of some of the IT security measures, particularly 
when the measures seem to be beyond those 
commonly found in other institutions and industries. 
For these users, excessive security is viewed as a 
hindrance to their productivity (Res. 17, 19, 25, 28, 
29 and 30). They are the lifeline of the business units. 
Furthermore, their productivity levels are behind the 
organizational raison d’etre. They may be inclined to 
have a negative attitude to security measures from the 
IT department. This group perceives that IT security 
staff are enamored with the latest in security 
technology and that some security is only undertaken 
as much to legitimize the security professionals’ roles 
as to benefit the organization. 
 
3.4 IT Security Indulgence 
  
The IT Security Indulgence professionals are the 
respondents who are indulging the IT department and 
the ITsec measures without feeling strongly for or 
against either. They are either ambivalent concerning 
ITsec and/or they are problem avoiders who want to 
comply in order to stay away with from troubles with 
IT or leadership. One of them expressed his opinions 
toward ITsec measures by saying:  
 
The way PHEI has set that up [single log-in] is 
actually quite efficient so it’s not like we’re 
having to keep track of a bunch of different log 
ins with a bunch of different passwords. I think 
we just assume that they have the appropriate 
amount of security to protect the systems that we 
have, and if they ask us to change passwords 
every three months or every six months or 
something, people just do it. (Faculty and chair). 
 
We asked another faculty about her knowledge 
and experiences with the Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) security guidelines. She responded: 
 
I know that you do have to agree to certain 
policies as you begin to use things like a VPN, 
but for the most part, that’s fairly standard, so I 
don’t have any problems with agreeing to any of 
the policies (Faculty) 
 
This group is comprised of non-IT professionals 
who either have solely administrative duties (Res 18 
and 32) or have fairly routine or low activity levels of 
work (Res 2, 24 and 27). They usually do not 
question increased ITsec measures and are either 




3.5 IT Knows Best 
 
IT Knows Best profile includes IT professionals 
who are either in senior IT positions (Resp. 12, 16 
and 21) and/or whose job role entails (fully or partly) 
the enforcement of security measures (Resp. 21) or 
the configuration and/or support of software 
implementations (Resp. 9, 14, and 15). These 
individuals are evaluated in their jobs partly based on 
security implementations. This group has also a 
number of users who are generally favorable toward 
both the overall ITsec measures and toward new 
security implementations.  
The IT Knows Best professionals exhibit highly 
positive attitudes regarding security measures.  One 
respondent explained with pride how the IT 
department uses a method created by the Department 
of Defense to erase all computers prior to recycling 
them: 
 
“We’ll bring the computer back, wait for two 
weeks to make sure they (the users) have all their 
files, and then we use the magnetic storage data 
sanitization, the Department of Defense has kind 
of a method that uses seven passes to wipe a hard 
drive. We wipe it with that. From there the 
computers go to pallets to be sold to recyclers.  
They have to be certified basically” (Desktop 
configuration specialist). 
 
The IT Knows Best professionals were not only 
quick to dismiss any inconvenience incurred by users 
resulting from PHEI’s security procedures but also 
assumed (wrongly, as above-mentioned sections 
revealed) that most users understood the necessity of 
tight security measures. When asked about the 
possible downsides of the mandated encryption on 
the institutionally provided laptops, the director of 
the repair shop replied: 
 
“It's an inconvenience, but I think most people 
probably understand the need for the security.  
There is a little bit of delay [in the repair of the 
institutionally provided laptops], as I mentioned, 
if we're trying to recover data or trying to run 
some utilities on the drive, the drive needs to be 
unencrypted. But again, I think most people 
understand why the security is there. Once we 
explain what we have to do, they're pretty 
understanding about that.” (Director of hardware 
support) 
 
The IT Knows Best professionals are driven by 
their belief in the necessity of constant security 
improvement and seem to have little awareness of 
how the security improvements are received by users.  
Their attitude is well summarized by the CISO: 
 
People are like, “That’s inconvenient.” I’m not 
saying it’s not inconvenient. I’d never make that 
claim. But what I’m saying is that the risk is so 
high that we have to take some additional action. 
Most of our, what I would say, changes that we 
do, absolutely come into place because there’s 
evidence to back up why we’re doing this (CISO). 
 
Unlike the skeptical users, these accepting users 
do not question the decisions of the IT department 
and acquiesce to any policies. An administrative user 
who also has a background in federal security 
contracting said “ITsec measures at PHEI are not 
constraining”. She further expressed her positive 
attitude toward the ITsec policies by adding: 
 
There’s an understanding of why they do what 
they do, and a thankfulness. I don’t fault them for 
the layers they put in place, and I don’t find 
they’re without reason. I think that the way they 
operate it is quite reasonable, especially for the 
amount of knowledge, and security, and 
information they store and maintain. When you 
think about having to pull transcripts from 15 or 
20 years ago, and with the incoming class of 
freshman of over 3,000, and multiply that. That in 
and of itself is just massive. Then you have the 
financials that have to be maintained, tuition 
records, and everything else. It’s an immense 
amount of information that’s required. I will never 
fault them in protecting that knowledge. I’m not 
saying don’t ever question, but when it comes to 
things like this, if you have a problem with this, 
why are you working here? We keep our 
information more secure than the government 
does, and I’m happy with that. (Office manager)  
 
In summary, we found that the attitude of IT 
Knows Best professionals toward ITsec measures is 
very positive. They systematically uphold the 
implemented security measures and perceive them 
with high regard. On the surface, this might seem 
obvious but as the previous sections demonstrated, 
neither all IT professionals nor all users are equally 
enthusiastic about IT security. 
 
3.6 IT Security Disconnect 
 
The IT Security Disconnect profile is comprised 
of users who feel that even though a real security 
breach could damage the university, they do not 
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believe that a breach of their own account or the loss 
of their own laptop constitutes a security breach. 
They therefore do not consider it important to abide 
by ITsec policies and may find the security measures 
unnecessarily constraining.  Their view of security 
allows for a disconnect between their own IT security 
habits and those prescribed by the university. One 
program director and senior professor expressed his 
views by saying: 
 
I do not understand AT ALL why my laptop 
needs to be encrypted.  Even if someone stole my 
laptop and even if that someone managed to guess 
my password (both events are unlikely and their 
simultaneous occurrence even more unlikely), I 
do not believe that this breaches the university's 
IT security.  I do believe that a "real" breach of 
security could hurt the university. I just do not 
believe that a "real" breach can be effectuated 
through my computer. (Senior professor and 
director of a program) 
 
Some professionals do not find that their use of 
some systems is a security breach. One example of 
this is from the university’s marketing department. A 
marketing manager purchased and began using an 
inexpensive analytics application in 2008. At the time 
of its initial purchase, the application had been 
approved by the IT department. Yet, subsequent to 
the establishment of the CISO position and the strict 
focus on security, the particular application was 
disapproved for use in other departments. The 
marketing department wanted to remain under the 
radar in order to continue to use a now disallowed 
system: 
 
“Do we really need as much security as they’re 
telling us we need? I don’t have details of that. I 
try to stay under the radar with this program we 
use so they don’t come after me, since it was 
implemented with PHEI’s support, but 
implemented before some of these extra security 
layers have been added” (Director of a program). 
 
Even the non-use of a security feature is regarded 
as valid. After encryption was enforced on 
institutionally provided mobile devices including 
laptops (which dramatically increased the repair time 
of the devices), some professionals abstained from 
using PHEI’s laptops. One software analyst and 
programmer told us: “Like one of the things that ITS 
wants is if you have a laptop, your hard drive has to 
be encrypted. That’s the rule, which is one of the 
reasons why I don’t have an [institutionally provided] 
laptop” (Senior IT analyst). 
In summary, we found four main profiles 
corresponding to two assumptions toward ITsec 
measures. These profiles have different outcomes for 
IT security behaviors. To this end, we dedicate the 
remainder of our paper in the following section. 
 
4. Outcomes of the Four Profiles 
 
The four groups in our matrix respond differently 
to security measures, even if they agree within their 
group on the security perspective. We found that the 
IT staff in the IT Security Overindulgence group 
although often frustrated, are more cautious in their 
assessments of IT intentions and are less prone to 
circumvent IT policies than the Security 
Overindulgence users. The latter group assumes that 
the IT department wants control, an assumption that 
we did not find in the interview texts of the IT client 
services (or at least not openly expressed in words). 
Furthermore, the security overindulgence users are 
more prone to be circumventors of ITsec measures. 
In the following table we briefly analyze the probable 
outcomes of each profile vis a vis security measures 
and we advance relevant propositions. Due to space 
limitations, this section is briefed in Table 1 and the 
quotations are limited to one quote per outcome. 
More quotes and proofs may be made available upon 
request by contacting the corresponding author. 
Some existing ITsec theories seem to resonate 
with and complement our theory (MSPP) in Figure 1 
although our theory differs from the existing ones in 
important areas. One of the most widely used theories 
in studies of IT security and IT security policy 
compliance is neutralization theory. Neutralization 
theory [26] describes the psychological techniques 
individuals use to justify socially undesirable 
behavior.  These include denial of responsibility, 
denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation 
of the condemners, appeal to higher loyalties, and the 
metaphor of the ledger.  Some of these techniques 
might be employed by individuals fitting our IT 
Overindulgence and IT Disconnect profiles.  
However, the neutralization techniques are not based 
on assumptions, but rather rationalizations.  In the 
case of neutralization, perpetrators are aware that 
they are behaving poorly but rationalize their 
behavior.  Our analysis focuses on the underpinning 
assumptions of individuals that then drive their 
behavior.  In the case of profiles, the individuals who 
are not complying with IT security policies do not 
believe that they are doing anything wrong. Hence, it 
is not that they are rationalizing, or neutralizing, their 
behavior; rather, based on their assumptions, they are 
acting rationally. Another theory called Control 
Reactance Compliance Model (CRCM) [15] has 
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some similarities with MSPP as well as major 
differences. CRCM introduces the notion of “threat 
to freedom”, “reactance to ITsec policy” and 
“proneness to reactance”. Reactance is the negative 
emotional response (i.e. anger, frustration…) that is 
caused by the loss or threat of loss of 
behavioral/decisional freedom. CRCM finds that the 
threat to freedom and the proneness to reactance both 
positively influence the reactance, which ultimately 
negatively impacts the intention to compliance with 
the new ITsec measure. Although our profiles IT 
Security Overindulgence and IT Security Disconnect 
profiles share outcomes with the Reactance construct 
in CRCM, MSPP focuses on individuals’ perceptions 
of IT security itself rather than on how IT security 
impedes, or promotes, their behavioral freedom.  We 
maintain that in order to influence individuals’ long-
term IT security behaviors, IT departments must 
shape individuals’ assumptions about security and 
not focus exclusively on the outcomes of their IT 
security behaviors. Finally, security literature 
profiling compliant and non-compliant employees 
focuses only on their motivations (malicious vs. non-
malicious) [28], their intentional vs. unintentional 
noncompliance [4] and their level of technology 
expertise [1]. Our paper moves away from these 
dimesions to analyze the working assumptions and 
backgrounds of compliant and non-compliant 
employees. 
 
5. Limitations, Contributions and 
Conclusion 
 
As with any research, ours is not without 
limitations. First, we conducted this research at one 
site. Some may argue that the validity of one site is 
questionable. Nevertheless, Sarker et al., [22] 
analyzed 98 qualitative articles and found that 52% 
of them used one case-based research. Indeed, case 
study methodologists have been asserting that one 
case-based studies are adequate [13]. Second, the 
results are drawn from one industry type, namely, 
education. This issue, it may be argued, limits the 
generalizability of the findings. It is true that limited 
generalizability is a threat to any qualitative research; 
nevertheless, we can prove that the educational site 
where this paper chose to conduct the research is a 
good proxy of other industries, particularly in terms 
of security breaches and research. Universities are the 
second most targeted sector (on a par with the retail 
sector) attacked by hackers after the healthcare 
sector. In 2014, 37% of reported security breaches 
involved the healthcare sector, and 11% and 10% of 
all the security breaches were related to the retail and 
educational sectors, respectively, as reported by 
Symantec and NBC news [27]. In 2015 alone, three 
major high profile security breaches hit Penn State 
University, the University of Connecticut, and the 
University of Virginia [27]. We believe the current 
reality of security breaches in the world, makes PHEI 
a relevant and credible proxy to other industries.  
We conducted a grounded theory approach 
interviewing employees in a higher education 
organization and exploring their views on security 
measures applied in their institution. This study 
makes several important contributions. Our research 
extends the IT security literature investigating non-
malicious security violators by looking at IT 
employees themselves as potential non-malicious 
violators. Most of the extant work treats IT 
employees as potential malicious violators because 
their expertise would seem to make it unlikely that 
they would inadvertently violate security policies. 
However, we uncover the possibility that IT 
employees can also be non-malicious violators. 
Future research should examine IT employees who 
are not necessarily disgruntled with their jobs or their 
organizations, but are ironically disgruntled with IT 
security itself. Second, this study revealed the 
underlying assumptions of employees in 
organizations regarding ITsec measures. The extant 
literature seldom touches on the assumptions of 
different groups concerning ITsec measures. Previous 
studies generally describe the antecedents of 
employee security behavior intentions. Our research 
examines the assumptions behind the antecedents of 
employee security behavior. Furthermore, future 
research is needed to incorporate IT 
expertise/knowledge into the MSPP matrix and  to 
control for it among the profiles. The preliminary 
findings in MSPP shows that there are no differences 
among the IT Security Disconnect and IT Security 
Overindulgence vis a vis IT expertise, since in both 
groups we found both users and IT staff who 
expressed the above mentioned assumptions in the 
analysis section. 
On the managerial level, this study challenges the 
dominant assumption of IT security and IT security 
policy compliance research that security and security 
compliance are de facto positive and good for 
organizations. We do not question the need for IT 
security, but our results do suggest that more security 
is not necessarily better security and that sometimes, 
in seeking to make oneself more secure, 
organizations inadvertently alienate high performing 
employees.  The data suggests that there can be 
adverse effects to increased security measures on user 
satisfaction with the IT department and on security 
itself, especially in cases where users feel that the 
security measures are unaccompanied by adequate 
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explanation and justification from the IT department 
toward the users (and other IT staff), thereby 
reinforcing their assumption of IT security 
overindulgence. The research on the downsides of 
ITsec measures is still young and evolving. We hope 
future researchers will extend and test the MSPP 
matrix with a view towards developing a stream of 
research that explicates the mixed and often 
contradictory feelings toward ITsec measures. 
 
Table 1: Profiles, Outcomes and Propositions 
Profile  
Outcome 
Quote  Proposition 
IT Knows Best (IT 
staff)  Security 
Enforcing 
“Most of our updates [on systems] are pushed out via a couple of different methods. So, most of them 
are pushed out. Despite the fact that they’re pushed out, we try to educate the users and make sure they 
know to check for updates, make sure their machine is updated and that sort of thing. But that’s easier 
said than done, getting them to actually do that, which is why we try to be pretty proactive about 
pushing out updates (Software support specialist).” 
Proposition 1: IT Knows Best IT staff will be more prone to enforce ITsec  measures than to explain 








“PHEI - IT security department has set the bar quite high, and I don’t necessarily fault them for that, 
but I do think that it’s a case where, because of their decision to set that bar high, you could argue it 
restricts certain business functions or business opportunities for the school. I guess I want to be careful 
that I’m not saying it’s necessarily... it’s not unnecessary, but because the expectation, the threshold has 
been set so high for security that it is restrictive to business process for us as a school (Director of a 
computer center). 
Proposition 2: IT Security Overindulgence IT members will be less prone than users to fault the ITsec  












“I think they go overboard on security. That’s another thing. We didn’t have any problems using our 
software, but that was before. I’ve been using it since 2008. I know another department is trying to add 
the same software we’re using, and PHEI is giving them fits. I got lucky. Security, they go above and 
beyond. (Res. 30)” 
In the words of a program director, “So yeah, my own feeling is some security they do because they 
feel like they need to do it to demonstrate that it’s state of the art security, even without reflecting on 
who it’s helping and what problem it’s solving.” (Senior professor) 
Proposition 3: Security measures without sufficient justification in the eyes of the users increase non-
malicious volitional security violations. 
Proposition 4: In the absence of circumvention opportunities, security measures without sufficient 
justification in the eyes of the users increase user frustration with the IT department. 
IT Knows Best 
(users) 
Cheerleading 
“You hear about all of these security breaches [in government], and hacks, and everything else.  The 
one thing I would say is that you very rarely hear of a university ever having to disclose that there has 
been a breach of their information.  If you consider all the financial records that are held by the 
universities, if they can protect it, why can’t you [government]?  Do you know what I mean? I would 
say universities have a model in place that would probably benefit some government areas (Office 
manager)” 
Proposition 5: Users who have worked in a security-related firm in the past will encourage increases of 





“I would assume that somewhere in the email is something about why and how important the VPN 
double authentication is, but I also assume that most of us don’t read our email that in detail, and we 
also skim websites where we’re picking up instructions on how to do the process we have to do, so we 
probably don’t explicitly process that message, but I think it’s there, but I’m assuming that.” (Faculty) 
Proposition 6: Users related to routine and administrative jobs will be more prone to comply with IT 
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